Expressive Power of Hybrid Systems with Variables, Parameters and Arrays

AbstractA hybrid system consists of a finite number of locations, variables and transitions. Different classes are considered in the literature. In this paper we study the different expressive power of these classes

Equational Reasonings in Wireless Network Gossip Protocols

Gossip protocols have been proposed as a robust and efficient method for disseminating information throughout large-scale networks. In this paper, we propose a compositional analysis technique to study formal probabilistic models of gossip protocols expressed in a simple probabilistic timed process calculus for wireless sensor networks. We equip the calculus with a simulation theory to compare probabilistic protocols that have similar behaviour up to a certain tolerance. The theory is used to prove a number of algebraic laws which revealed to be very effective to estimate the performances of gossip networks, with and without communication collisions, and randomised gossip networks. Our simulation theory is an asymmetric variant of the weak bisimulation metric that maintains most of the properties of the original definition. However, our asymmetric version is particularly suitable to reason on protocols in which the systems under consideration are not approximately equivalent, as in the case of gossip protocols

A Formal Approach to Cyber-Physical Attacks

We apply formal methods to lay and streamline theoretical foundations to reason about Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) and cyber-physical attacks. We focus on %a formal treatment of both integrity and DoS attacks to sensors and actuators of CPSs, and on the timing aspects of these attacks. Our contributions are threefold: (1) we define a hybrid process calculus to model both CPSs and cyber-physical attacks; (2) we define a threat model of cyber-physical attacks and provide the means to assess attack tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack; (3) we formalise how to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible quantifications of the success chances of an attack. We illustrate definitions and results by means of a non-trivial engineering application

A Semantic Theory of the Internet of Things (extended abstract)

We propose a process calculus for modelling and reasoning on systems in the Internet of Things paradigm. Our systems interact both with the physical environment, via sensors and actuators, and with smart devices, via short-range and Internet channels. The calculus is equipped with a standard notion of labelled bisimilarity which represents a fully abstract characterisation of a well-known contextual equivalence. We use our semantic proof-methods to prove run-time properties of a non-trivial case study as well as system equalities

On the decidability of linear bounded periodic cyber-physical systems

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of distributed computing systems with physical processes via a networking with actuators and sensors, where feedback loops among the components allow the physical processes to affect the computations and vice versa. Although CPSs can be found in several complex and sometimes critical real-world domains, their verification and validation often relies on simulation-test systems rather then automatic methodologies to formally verify safety requirements. In this work, we prove the decidability of the reachability problem for discrete-time linear CPSs whose physical process in isolation has a periodic behavior, up to an initial transitory phase

A process calculus approach to correctness enforcement of PLCs

We define a simple process calculus, based on Hennessy and Regan\u2019s Timed Process Language, for specifying networks of communicating programmable logic controllers (PLCs) enriched with monitors enforcing specifications compliance. We define a synthesis algorithm that given an uncorrupted PLC returns a monitor that enforces the correctness of the PLC, even when injected with malware that may forge/drop actuator commands and inter-controller communications. Then, we strengthen the capabilities of our monitors by allowing the insertion of actions to mitigate malware activities. This gives us deadlock-freedom monitoring: malware may not drag monitored controllers into deadlock states